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Free Exercise After the Arab Spring: Protecting Egypt’s 
Religious Minorities Under the Country’s New Constitution 
JAMES MICHAEL NOSSETT* 
I am concerned that respect for religious freedom [in Egypt] is quite 
tenuous. 
 
 —Former U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, July 30, 20121 
INTRODUCTION 
The popular uprisings of the Arab Spring brought a bright hope for greater rights 
and freedoms for the inhabitants of the Arab World. With the toppling of 
dictatorships and the spread of democracy, peoples that were once oppressed 
claimed for themselves the opportunity to live in nations governed by the will of 
society, rather than by the dictates of an oppressive regime. One such people was 
the nation of Egypt. 
On January 25, 2011, Egyptians of all ages began mass demonstrations across 
the country in protest of the three-decade dictatorship of Hosni Mubarak, 
demanding increased freedom, political change, and social justice.2 The 
demonstrations proved successful: seventeen days later, Mubarak resigned and 
transitioned governing responsibilities to the Egyptian military,3 which announced 
its desires “to permit an elected civil authority to be in charge of the country, [and] 
to build a democratic free nation.”4 With democratic elections and the drafting of a 
new constitution on the horizon, it seemed that the goals of the revolution were to 
be realized, that oppressions common under the Mubarak regime would cease, and 
that the longstanding tensions between the nation’s government and its religious 
groups—and sectarian strife among the religious groups themselves—would finally 
be addressed. 
Despite these hopes, the events of the ensuing months brought only deepened 
social division and more sectarian strife. With Mubarak gone, long-present tensions 
                                                                                                                 
 
 * J.D. Candidate, 2014, Indiana University Maurer School of Law. This piece is 
dedicated to the people of Egypt, that they might worship freely and in peace; to the staff of 
the Indiana Law Journal, in recognition of their tireless efforts; to my parents, for their love 
and support; and to my beautiful wife, Grace, whom I love most dearly. May grace and 
peace be with you all. 
 1. Hillary Rodham Clinton, U.S. Sec’y of State, Remarks at the Release of the 2011 
International Religious Freedom Report, (July 30, 2012), available at http://www.state.gov
/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2012/07/195782.htm. 
 2. See infra Part II.B.1. 
 3. Full Text: Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak’s Resignation Statement, GUARDIAN 
(Feb. 11, 2011, 3:22 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/feb/11/full-text-hosni
-mubarak-resignation. 
 4. Ben Hubbard & Maggie Michael, Egypt Army Commits to Power Transfer, Israel 
Peace, WASH. TIMES (Feb. 12, 2011), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/feb/12
/egypt-govt-officials-banned-traveling-abroad/?page=all#pagebreak (quoting statements 
made by Egyptian military leaders). 
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between the country’s more conservative Islamist factions (including the Muslim 
Brotherhood) on the one hand, and the country’s Coptic minority and liberals on 
the other hand, took center stage in the form of disputed elections,5 boycotts of the 
constitutional drafting process,6 acts of violence,7 and large-scale protests.8 A new 
government—including the first democratically elected leader of the country, 
Mohamed Morsi—was elected,9 and a new constitution was drafted and ratified,10 
but these measures were not enough to quell the tensions.11 On July 3, 2013, after 
days of protests, military forces removed the government from power, suspended 
the new constitution, and installed a new transitional government in an effort to 
stop the ongoing turmoil.12 On January 14 and 15, 2014, 38.6% of Egyptians turned 
out to approve yet another constitution, but proponents of the Morsi government 
and Islamist parties boycotted the election, deeming it illegal and illegitimate.13 As 
of this writing, protests and political upheaval characterize daily life14 and acts of 
sectarian violence continue15—in short, tensions in Egypt remain high. 
For a number of reasons, therefore, the coming months are crucial for the future 
of Egypt. A stable and legitimate government must be established, and the nation’s 
fractured economy must receive attention.16 Yet, more importantly, the coming 
months hold the fate of the Arab Spring in Egypt. Will the goals of the 
revolution—achieving social justice, increased freedom, and political change—be 
achieved, or will conditions of life and of politics in Egypt worsen or, at best, 
remain the same as they were in the Mubarak era? 
This Note is particularly concerned with the future of religious exercise in 
Egypt—that is, the ability of Egyptians to freely exercise their beliefs without 
restriction by the state, and without interference by nonstate actors. While certain 
adherents of the nation’s dominant religious demographic (Sunni Muslims)17 have 
                                                                                                                 
 
 5. See, e.g., Mohamed Fadel Fahmy, 10 Egyptian Presidential Candidates 
Disqualified, CNN (Apr. 16, 2012, 6:15 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/04/14/world/meast
/egypt-elections/. 
 6. See, e.g., Egypt’s Copts Quit Constitution Drafting Panel, FOX NEWS (Apr. 2, 
2012), http://www.foxnews.com/world/2012/04/02/egypts-copts-quit-constitution-drafting
-panel/. 
 7. See infra Parts II.B.3.b. and II.C.3.b. 
 8. See infra Part II.B. 
 9. See infra Part II.C.1. 
 10. See infra Part II.C.2. 
 11. See infra Parts II.C.3 and II.D. 
 12. See infra Part II.D.1. 
 13. See Egypt Referendum: ‘98% Back New Constitution,’ BBC NEWS (Jan. 19, 2014, 
2:43 PM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-25796110. 
 14. See generally infra Part II.D. 
 15. See infra Part II.D.3.b. 
 16. “[T]he country is currently running a deficit of 15 percent of GDP, while being kept 
afloat only by the inflow of funds from the Gulf countries.” Dalibor Rohac, Egypt’s Subsidy 
Nightmare, CATO INST. (Nov. 6, 2013, 9:27 AM), http://www.cato.org/blog/egypts-subsidy
-nightmare?utm_content=buffer8365c&utm_source=buffer&utm_medium=twitter&utm
_campaign=Buffer. 
 17. See infra Part I.A. 
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encountered some state-imposed restrictions18 and disruptions in their abilities to 
freely practice their faith, adherents of minority religions in Egypt—
Coptic Christians, Baha’is, and others—have long faced both legal and cultural 
restrictions on and impediments to their abilities to freely exercise their beliefs.19 
Taking the forms of official, state-enforced restrictions on religious exercise, and of 
oppression, persecution, and sectarian violence by nonstate actors, Egypt’s 
religious minorities have endured decades of limitations on their abilities to 
practice their respective faiths. Now, in the aftermath of the Arab Spring, Egypt has 
a prime opportunity to address such restrictions through the adoption of strong and 
enforceable rights of free exercise in the nation’s new constitution. 
Therefore, this Note examines the plight of religious minorities in Egypt before, 
during, and after the Arab Spring—that is, under the Mubarak regime, during the 
January 25 Revolution and the Morsi government, and into the future—and 
proposes a number of constitutional design features that the framers of Egypt’s new 
legal system should adopt in order to enable these groups to more freely exercise 
their beliefs without abuse from state and nonstate actors. The Note begins in Part I 
with a brief overview of Egypt’s religious demographics and cultural conceptions 
of identity and religious exercise. In Part II, this Note examines the treatment of 
Egyptian religious minorities by both state and nonstate actors (A) under the 
Mubarak regime, (B) in the immediate aftermath of the January 25 Revolution, 
(C) under the Morsi government, and (D) in the immediate aftermath of the 
June 30 Revolution until the time of this writing. This Note then concludes Part II 
with an analysis of the future of Egypt’s religious minorities as it appears at the 
time of this writing, identifying a number of concerns regarding their abilities to 
exercise their beliefs. 
Finally, in Part III, this Note argues that Egypt must enshrine religious liberty and 
free exercise in the nation’s new Constitution through guaranteed individual rights 
and effective enforcement mechanisms to implement such rights against both state 
and nonstate actors. This Part argues that the framers of Egypt’s governing system 
under its new Constitution should, at the very least, engage in the following steps: 
(A) explicitly adopt the Supreme Constitutional Court’s 1996 interpretation of 
Article 46 of the 1971 Constitution as the state’s official interpretation of similar 
language in the country’s new Constitution; (B) ensure the creation and continuance 
of institutional structures to incentivize accountability and enforcement of religious 
freedom guarantees; (C) ensure that its horizontal rights provisions protecting 
freedom of belief and religious practice are enforced; and (D) ensure the 
enforcement in domestic courts of international human rights conventions to which 
it has agreed. Additionally, though it would be more difficult to implement than the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 18. Notably, they have faced a ban on religiously based political parties, see Dina 
Guirguis, Stability or Rigidity? Egypt’s Use of Constitutional and Executive Power, WASH. 
INST. FOR NEAR EAST POL’Y (Nov. 16, 2010), https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy
-analysis/view/stability-or-rigidity-egypts-use-of-constitutional-and-executive-power, and 
more recently, certain of their political groups—most notably, the Muslim Brotherhood—
have been banned and declared to be terrorist organizations, see Egypt Declares Muslim 
Brotherhood a Terrorist Group, FOX NEWS (Dec. 25, 2013), http://www.foxnews.com/world
/2013/12/25/egypt-declares-muslim-brotherhood-terrorist-group/. 
 19. See infra Part II.A.2. 
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above steps, this Part further argues that Egypt’s leaders should (E) remove 
restrictive language from constitutional provisions that guarantee religious freedom.  
I. RELIGION AND THE CULTURE OF EGYPT 
The challenges that Egypt’s minority religions face are the products of the 
nation’s religious demographics and cultural heritage. Therefore, to more fully 
understand the treatment both past and present of Egypt’s religious minorities, one 
must first understand the country’s composition and grasp its concepts of identity 
and religious exercise. 
A. Religious Demographics 
Both ethnically and religiously, the population of Egypt is very homogenous. 
Egypt’s 85.3 million residents are nearly all ethnic Egyptians (99.6% of the 
population), and 90% are Sunni Muslims.20 The remaining 10% of Egyptians 
belong mostly to religions accepted and recognized by Islamic and government 
authorities (the “heavenly religions” of Christianity and Judaism),21 though a small 
percentage of Egyptians belong to religions that the state does not officially accept 
or recognize (most notably Baha’is and Shi’a Muslims).22 
Of the recognized religions, the largest minority religion is Christianity, most of 
whose adherents are Copts.23 The Copts are an Egyptian Orthodox sect of 
Christianity that traces its origin back to the time of the apostles and has its own 
patriarch (the “Coptic Pope”).24 A much smaller percentage of Christians in Egypt 
belong to numerous other Christian denominations.25 In addition, a very small 
number of Jews still live in Egypt.26 
Non-Abrahamic religious minorities are only minimally present in Egypt.27 
Members of the Baha’i faith have been in Egypt since 1910,28 numbering 5000 at 
                                                                                                                 
 
 20. CIA, Egypt, in WORLD FACTBOOK (2014), available at https://www.cia.gov/library
/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/eg.html. 
 21. Islam officially recognizes only the “heavenly” or “divine” or “Abrahamic” 
religions that pre-existed Islam—Judaism and Christianity. See BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, 
HUM. RTS. & LABOR, EGYPT 2012 INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT, U.S. DEP’T 
OF STATE 4 [hereinafter 2012 BUREAU REPORT], available at http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf
/religiousfreedom/index.htm?year=2012&dlid=208386#wrapper; Samuel Tadros, Heritage 
Foundation, Religious Freedom in Egypt, BACKGROUNDER NO. 2487, Nov. 9, 2012, at 5. 
 22. 2012 BUREAU REPORT, supra note 21, at 4. 
 23. See id. 
 24. See Scott Kent Brown II, Comment, The Coptic Church in Egypt: A Comment on 
Protecting Religious Minorities from Nonstate Discrimination, 2000 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1049, 
1051–53. 
 25. See Tadros, supra note 21, at 2; CIA, supra note 20. 
 26. Approximately 120 Jews still live in Egypt. Tadros, supra note 21, at 2. Note, in the 
early 1900s, Egypt’s Jewish population numbered roughly 80,000. David Kenner, What 
Happened to the Jews of Egypt?, PASSPORT: FOREIGN POL’Y L. BLOG (Mar. 27, 2013, 7:43 
AM), http://blog.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/03/27/what_happened_to_the_jews_of_egypt. 
 27. See Ahl al-Kitab, ENCYC. BRITANNICA (2013), available at http://www.britannica.com
/EBchecked/topic/10067/Ahl-al-Kitab; Tadros, supra note 21, at 2–4. 
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their peak in the middle of the twentieth century;29 while only a small number of 
Baha’i followers (roughly 2000) are in Egypt today, they have prominently 
featured in disputes over religious freedom over the past two decades.30 
Additionally, a small number of non-Sunni Muslims—including roughly 300 
Shi’a—live in Egypt today, but are unrecognized due to their beliefs.31 Further, a 
handful of Jehovah’s Witnesses and Latter Day Saints currently reside in Egypt.32 
B. Identity and Religious Exercise in Egypt 
The treatment of religious minorities today is due in large part to the ways that 
Egyptians conceive both their national identity and religious exercise. During the 
sixteenth to nineteenth centuries, the Ottoman Empire ruled Egypt and 
administered it such that “[e]ach religious group was [its own nation,] given 
autonomy in its own affairs.”33 This practice caused each group to be “viewed as 
both alien and constituting a collective identity,” and created a situation in which 
“new religious groups were viewed with suspicion as they deviated and broke away 
from the organized and recognized sects.”34 Coupled with the dominance of Islam 
in the country,35 this practice has allowed group identities to so permeate Egyptian 
culture that the country has maintained internal divisions along religious lines. 
Surprisingly, out of this divided culture grew an Egyptian nationalism rooted in 
a common, Egyptian identity—one that proved strong enough to weaken and 
eventually overthrow British colonial authorities in the early-twentieth century.36 
Unsurprisingly, however, with internal upheaval over the last several decades and 
the twin tides of Pan-Arabism37 and Islamism38 that swept the region during the 
same period, the internal fractures in Egyptian culture have become more 
pronounced, undermining the “Egyptian” identity that once held the various 
religious cultures together.39 
Religious practice in Egypt, in turn, is colored both by this concept of group 
identity and by the dominance of Islam in the country. As Samuel Tadros aptly 
                                                                                                                 
 28. See Johanna Pink, A Post-Qur’ānic Religion Between Apostasy and Public Order: 
Egyptian Muftis and Courts on the Legal Status of the Bahā’ī Faith, 10 ISLAMIC L. & SOC’Y 
409, 410 (2003). 
 29. Id. at 412. 
 30. See Tadros, supra note 21, at 2, 12. 
 31. U.S. COMM’N ON INT’L RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 
REPORT FOR 2010, at 229 [hereinafter 2010 REPORT], available at http://www.uscirf.gov/sites
/default/files/resources/annual%20report%202010.pdf. 
 32. The U.S. State Department estimates that there are between 800 and 1200 Jehovah’s 
Witnesses in Egypt, but they are unrecognized due to a 1960 presidential decree. See id. at 
234. 
 33. Tadros, supra note 21, at 2. 
 34. Id. 
 35. See Brown, supra note 24, at 1051; see also supra Part I.A. 
 36. See Tadros, supra note 21, at 2. 
 37. See generally ELIE PODEH, THE DECLINE OF ARAB UNITY: THE RISE AND FALL OF THE 
UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC (1999). 
 38. See, e.g., ARE KNUDSEN, POLITICAL ISLAM IN THE MIDDLE EAST 1 (2003), available 
at http://www.cmi.no/publications/2003/rep/r2003-3.pdf. 
 39. See Tadros, supra note 21, at 2. 
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stated in a 2010 Heritage Foundation study, “[t]he basic Egyptian understanding of 
religious freedom is limited, often understood as simply freedom to worship, albeit 
under significant constraints. An understanding of religious freedom as the right of 
all faiths to bring religiously based values to the public square is virtually 
nonexistent.”40 In a 1994 interview, the Mubarak regime’s Minister of Religious 
Affairs, Muhammed Ali Mahjub, noted that “[f]reedom in Islam means 
commitment and good behavior, not chaos and disunity,” and that “any attempt to 
slander religion”—a term that has been interpreted quite broadly41—“is a call to 
dismember the homeland and cannot be termed freedom of expression.”42 As such, 
freedom of religious exercise in Egypt is a limited concept, protecting belief itself 
but not the expression of that belief—particularly if that belief conflicts with the 
beliefs of others. Accordingly, the guarantees of religious exercise that Egypt has 
created have heretofore been subject to narrow application.43 
II. MINORITY RELIGIOUS EXERCISE IN EGYPT’S PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE 
The story of minority religious exercise in Egypt’s past and present is one of 
uncertainty and inconsistency. Rights of religious exercise have always been 
included in the Egyptian governing structure, at least in some form; yet, minority 
religions have still encountered many restrictions pertaining to their abilities to 
exercise their respective faiths—both explicit restrictions and practical ones—
imposed by both state and nonstate actors. This Part traces the treatment of 
religious minorities from the years under Mubarak (Subpart A), during the 
January 25 Revolution and its immediate aftermath (Subpart B), under the Morsi 
government (Subpart C), and from the June 30 Revolution to the time of this 
writing (Subpart D), showing that state and nonstate actors have continued to 
impede these religious groups in the exercise of their respective faiths in the 
months since the January 25 Revolution. 
A. Religious Exercise Under Mubarak 
The Mubarak regime’s policies regarding religious exercise both for religious 
minorities and for the Islamic majority were inconsistent—at times benevolent, at 
times harsh, and at times ambivalent. Provisions protecting religious exercise 
existed in the regime’s Constitution, but state enforcement of these rights often did 
not occur. Likewise, the state imposed restrictive regulations on religious exercise, 
interfered with and persecuted religious groups (both majority and minority), and 
did little to stop nonstate acts of violence against religious minorities. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 40. Id. at 3. 
 41. See Parts II.A.2.a, II.B.3.a, and II.C.3.a. 
 42. Interview by Pedro C. Moreno, Int’l Coordinator of the Rutherford Inst., with 
Muhammed Ali Mahjub, Minister of Religious Affairs (Awkaf) in Egypt (Sept. 10, 1994), as 
reprinted in HANDBOOK ON RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AROUND THE WORLD 264 (Pedro C. Moreno 
ed., 1996). 
 43. See infra Part II.A. 
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1. Provisions Under Mubarak 
The Constitution under the Mubarak regime44 was established in 1971 and 
featured a number of broadly worded clauses protecting religious liberty and 
religious exercise; however, it also established Islam as the state religion and the 
source of law.45 Article 40 guaranteed equality “before the law . . . without 
discrimination . . . due to . . . religion or creed.”46 Additionally, Article 46 provided 
that “[t]he State shall guarantee the freedom of belief and the freedom of practice of 
religious rites,”47 which Egypt’s Supreme Constitutional Court (SCC) interpreted in 
the following manner: “No one may be compelled to believe in a religion which 
[one] denies; to declare the religion to which [one] adheres; to withdraw from the 
[religion one] has chosen, or to favor a particular religion in prejudice to another, 
either by way of contempt, defamation or renunciation.”48 Article 2, however, 
established Islam both as the state’s official religion and as the foundation of its 
legal code, thereby allowing legislative implementation of Islamic principles.49 
Though the SCC limited the application of the amended form of this Article to laws 
passed after the Article was amended,50 this establishment of religion colored the 
implementation of religious exercise provisions such as Articles 40 and 46 in 
practicality, especially for minority religions. 
2. Religious Exercise Limitations and Abuses 
Despite Egypt’s constitutional protections, religious minorities have faced 
restrictions on the exercise of their beliefs, both from state and nonstate actors. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 44. For a concise summary of Egypt’s former regime and its leader, Hosni Mubarak, see 
Profile: Hosni Mubarak, BBC NEWS (Aug. 22, 2013, 1:36 PM), http://www.bbc.co.uk
/news/world-middle-east-12301713. 
 45. See CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, Sept. 11, 1971, as amended, 
May 22, 1980, May 25, 2005, Mar. 26, 2007, art. 2. 
 46. Id. art. 40. 
 47. Id. art. 46. 
 48. Case no. 8/17/Supreme Constitutional Court (Egypt), as quoted in TAMIR 
MOUSTAFA, THE STRUGGLE FOR CONSTITUTIONAL POWER: LAW, POLITICS, AND ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT IN EGYPT 166 (2007). An alternative translation reads as follows: “an 
individual is not to be compelled to accept a creed that he does not share or renounce a creed 
that he has entered into or that he has proclaimed. One creed should not be discriminated 
against in favor of others through denunciation, contempt or disdain.” Nathan J. Brown & 
Clark B. Lombardi, The Supreme Constitutional Court of Egypt on Islamic Law, Veiling and 
Civil Rights: An Annotated Translation of Supreme Constitutional Court of Egypt Case No. 8 
of Judicial Year 17 (May 18, 1996), 21 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 437, 457 (2006). 
 49. See CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, Sept. 11, 1971, as amended, 
May 22, 1980, May 25, 2005, Mar. 26, 2007, art. 2; Tamir Moustafa, The Islamist Trend in 
Egyptian Law, 3 POL. & RELIGION 610, 610 (2010). 
 50. See Moustafa, supra note 49, at 619–20. 
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a. State Actors 
Though the state is obligated to protect minority religious exercise, the 
authoritarian regimes of the past several decades51 have allowed, enabled, and even 
authorized a number of significant restrictions on religious expression by minority 
religions. Through regulatory measures, the Egyptian government made it very 
difficult for minority religions (both recognized and unrecognized) to build, alter, 
or rebuild their houses of worship, and the government made it effectively 
impossible for converts to minority religions or believers in unrecognized faiths to 
practice their faith in the country. 
Restrictions on the building and maintenance of non-Muslim houses of worship 
are perhaps some of the most obvious and practical state restrictions on minority 
religious exercise. Since 1856, the state has required that non-Muslims get the 
permission of the ruler (which, between 1962 and 2005, was interpreted to mean 
the Egyptian President52 or the governors) prior to receiving a permit to build or 
renovate their religious spaces.53 This requirement has proven more than 
meddlesome, as the state proved reluctant and slow to grant permission and, even if 
it did, it proved even more reluctant to allow the building or renovation to 
continue.54 Most seriously, this requirement heavily restricted Coptic efforts to 
reconstruct houses of worship damaged or destroyed by terrorism and sectarian 
violence.55 Where religious minorities built or modified their structures without 
permission, security forces sealed the structures’ doors with wax.56 
Similarly, previous regimes impeded minority religious exercise by requiring 
that citizens place their religious affiliation on their national ID cards,57 while only 
certain religions were officially recognized by the state.58 Therefore, members of 
minority religions not recognized by the state—Jehovah’s Witnesses, Latter-Day 
Saints, minority Muslim groups, and Baha’is—were prevented from having 
                                                                                                                 
 
 51. The Nasser Regime (1956–70); the Sadat Regime (1970–81); and the 
Mubarak Regime (1981–2011). See Egypt Profile: Timeline, BBC (Feb. 26, 2014, 7:53 AM), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13315719. 
 52. See HANDBOOK ON RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AROUND THE WORLD, supra note 42. 
 53. See 2010 REPORT, supra note 31, at 232. One report noted a priest’s complaint that 
he could not “even paint without the permission of Hosni Mubarak.” See HANDBOOK ON 
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AROUND THE WORLD, supra note 42, at 267 (quoting Virginia N. Sherry, 
The Predicament of Egypt’s Christian Minority, 110 CHRISTIAN CENTURY 717, 717 (1993)). 
 54. From 1998 to summer 2009, only “67 permits for new churches were approved and 
2,475 existing churches were granted permission to expand or make repairs,” and “even in 
cases where approval . . . ha[d] been granted, . . . local security services prevent[ed] 
construction or repair, in some cases for many years.” 2010 REPORT, supra note 31, at 232. 
Thus, “the approval process . . . is [a] time-consuming and inflexible” barrier to minority 
free exercise. Id. 
 55. See id. 
 56. HANDBOOK ON RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AROUND THE WORLD, supra note 42, at 272. For 
perspective, “[d]uring the first five months of 1992, the government issued only two permits 
and closed more than seven ‘illegally constructed’ churches in the Cairo area alone.” Id. 
 57. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, PROHIBITED IDENTITIES 14 (2007), available at 
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/egypt1107webwcover.pdf. 
 58. Id.; supra Parts I.A–B. 
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national ID cards and, thus, from obtaining birth certificates, enrolling in schools, 
or securely holding employment.59 Members of minority religious groups without 
these national ID cards were effectively prohibited from living, learning, and 
working in Egypt.60 Although a recent SCC ruling allowed Baha’is to have the 
religious identification section of their national ID cards left blank, not all Baha’i 
applicants received such cards.61 And, because “Egyptian courts have held that 
Muslims may not change their identity papers to reflect conversion,” converts to 
minority religions were further impeded and practically discouraged from changing 
their religious beliefs.62 
Further, the Mubarak regime restricted minority religious exercise rights by 
interfering with their activities—including, in some instances, persecuting them 
through police action—and failing to protect them from acts of violence by 
nonstate actors. 
Whether for political purposes or in accordance with Islamic law, the Mubarak 
regime and its predecessors actively interfered with and persecuted religious 
minorities. Presidential decrees heavily restricted or banned various minority 
religions.63 The government also enforced Shari’a prohibitions of apostasy and 
proselytization through article 98f of the Penal Code64 and the Emergency Laws in 
order “to detain—and subsequently, often maltreat or even torture—Muslims 
accused of apostasy.”65 Further instances of state persecution of religious 
                                                                                                                 
 
 59. Tadros, supra note 21, at 12. 
 60. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 57, at 14. 
 61. See Tadros, supra note 21, at 11–12. 
 62. HANDBOOK ON RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AROUND THE WORLD, supra note 42, at 268. 
 63. For instance, in 1960, President Nasser banned the members of the Baha’i faith by 
“revoking the community’s corporate status and confiscating [their] properties.” HUMAN 
RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 57, at 18. A similar 1960 decree banned “all Jehovah’s 
Witnesses activities.” U.S. COMM’N ON INT’L RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, INTERNATIONAL 
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT FOR 2013, at 56 [hereinafter 2013 REPORT], available at 
http://www.uscirf.gov/sites/default/files/resources/2013%20USCIRF%20Annual%20Report
%20%282%29.pdf. Similarly, in response to sweeping sectarian violence in 1981, President 
Sadat banished Coptic Pope Shenouda III and arrested hundreds of Copts. Brown, supra note 
24, at 1062. 
 64. Article 98f prohibits the use of religion to “ignite strife, degrade any of the heavenly 
religions or harm national unity or social peace.” Maurits S. Berger, Apostasy and Public 
Policy in Contemporary Egypt: An Evaluation of Recent Cases from Egypt’s Highest Courts, 
25 HUM RTS. Q. 720, 722 n.4 (2003). 
 65. Id. Religious conversion in Islam is a one-way street: minority religions are allowed 
to convert to Islam, but Muslims may not convert to minority religions unless they formerly 
belonged to that minority religion—and then only with great difficulty. See Tadros, supra 
note 21, at 10 (“Even in these rare instances, the Interior Ministry has refused to issue 
[minority ex-converts] new ID cards.”); Thomas Najjar, Democracy Under Islam: Rejection, 
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minorities66 include unexplained detentions,67 detentions for acts of religious 
expression,68 and torture or physical abuse during detention.69 
Previous regimes also facilitated the persecution of religious minorities 
indirectly by failing to enforce protective provisions,70 by responding inadequately 
to religious violence,71 and by ineffectively preparing to deal with religious 
violence altogether.72 Time and again, the state “dealt” with nonstate acts of 
violence against religious minorities by withholding punishment and hosting 
“reconciliation sessions” for all parties to play nice and get along,73 or by meting 
out punishment haphazardly and arresting members of the victim minority 
religion.74 Egyptian security forces, on several occasions, were accused of 
“‘allowing Islamic extremists to commit acts of anti-Christian violence with their 
complete knowledge, sometimes even when they had advance warnings.’”75 One 
such instance was “the Al-Kosheh violence in January of 2000, where . . . security 
forces failed to implement any preventive plans between the initial confrontations 
between Copts and Muslims and the bloody massacre two days later.”76 
b. Nonstate Actors 
Facilitated by such inaction by the state, the “most radical” restrictions on 
minority religious exercise in Egypt came from acts of violence perpetrated by 
fellow residents of Egypt.77 Nonstate, sectarian violence in Egypt has been 
extremely deadly and unfortunately commonplace.78 While a detailed account of 
the violence among religious groups is beyond the scope of this Note, in general 
terms, nonstate acts of violence have caused the deaths of thousands of Egyptians 
(most of them belonging to religious minority groups) over the last several 
decades.79 Facilitated by state inaction, nonstate, sectarian violence proved to be a 
major impediment to minority religious exercise in Egypt. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 66. See generally, e.g., 2010 REPORT, supra note 31. 
 67. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 57, at 56–57. 
 68. See id. at 57–58. 
 69. See id. at 56–58. 
 70. See 2010 REPORT, supra note 31, at 230. 
 71. See Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights & Labor, 2009 Country Reports on Human 
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 77. Id. at 1069. 
 78. See generally, e.g., 2012 BUREAU REPORT, supra note 21. 
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of violence motivated in large part by religion. Brown, supra note 24, at 1070. For a detailed 
account and analysis, see generally, for example, 2012 BUREAU REPORT, supra note 21. 
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B. Religious Exercise During the Arab Spring 
As was the case in many countries across the Arab World in 2011, the citizens 
of Egypt rose up in protest against the existing regime and brought about its 
downfall, ushering in the hope of a sweeping increase in civil and political rights.80 
While the revolution brought some relief, many of the existing abuses, failures, and 
restrictions on minority religious exercise remained. 
1. Tahrir Square and Beyond 
The events of the January 25 Revolution were bathed from beginning to end in 
the rhetoric of protest for greater rights. Weeks earlier, following the lead of the 
Tunisians, thousands of Egyptians across the nation rose up in mass protests against 
the Mubarak regime, beginning on January 25, 2011, most notably in Cairo’s 
Tahrir Square.81 Their reasons were clear: “We are telling President Mubarak to 
go . . . . The Egyptian people no longer want this system. [Mubarak has] closed all 
doors to peaceful change.”82 “In the streets of Cairo, Alexandria, and Suez,” Amr 
Hamzawy reported, “the only slogans heard demanded change, freedom, social 
justice and a stop to corruption.”83 On February 11, 2011, after two-and-a-half 
weeks of largely peaceful protests, Mubarak announced that he would be stepping 
down from the Egyptian Presidency and handing power over to the military.84 
Announcing its intention to govern until free elections could be held,85 the 
governing Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF) “dissolved the parliament, 
suspended the constitution, formed a committee to recommend constitutional 
amendments, and called for presidential and parliamentary elections.”86 Later, it 
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 84. Chris McGreal & Jack Shenker, Hosni Mubarak Resigns—and Egypt Celebrates a 
New Dawn, GUARDIAN (Feb. 11, 2011, 2:43 PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/feb
/11/hosni-mubarak-resigns-egypt-cairo. 
 85. Chris McGreal, Egypt’s Military Rejects Swift Transfer of Power and Suspends 
Constitution, GUARDIAN (Feb. 13, 2011, 3:28 PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011
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“issued a 63-article constitutional declaration to govern the country through the 
transition[,] and issued laws governing the formation of political parties and the 
structure of parliamentary elections.”87 
2. Developments Concerning Religious Exercise During  
the Revolution’s Immediate Aftermath 
The SCAF took a number of steps affecting minority religions when it took over 
managerial control of Egypt: first, as mentioned above, it suspended and replaced 
the 1971 Constitution with a new but temporary Constitutional Declaration; second, 
it repealed or attempted to repeal certain statutory provisions in an effort to make 
minority religious exercise rights more effective; and third, it made efforts to 
protect religious minorities from acts of nonstate violence. 
Although the March 2011 Constitutional Declaration altered the structure of 
government, it largely retained the status quo regarding religion: Islam remained 
the state’s religion and Shari’a remained prominent in the legal culture, but the 
rights of all were (at least nominally) protected. Article 2 of the document was 
identical to the same Article in the 1971 Constitution.88 Article 6 of the document 
guaranteed the equal protection of laws and equality of rights and duties, and it 
protected against discrimination “due to . . . religion, or creed.”89 Article 11 
guaranteed “freedom of creed, and practicing religious rites.”90 
The SCAF acted on behalf of religious minorities by amending provisions of the 
various codes to prohibit discrimination on religious grounds. Further, the SCAF 
amended the Penal Code to “prohibit discrimination on the basis of religion . . . [or] 
faith” and “delineated prison sentences and specific fines for discriminatory acts, as 
well as [for] failure to prevent discrimination[, including] more severe penalties for 
government officials found to be complicit in discrimination.”91 Additionally, the 
SCAF attempted to amend the requirement that non-Muslim religious organizations 
get permission from the government for constructing or maintaining houses of 
worship and replaced it with requirements that would apply to all religions.92 
However, due to discontent on the part of “Muslims, Christians, and Egyptian 
human rights groups” with the text of the proposal, the amended law was 
withdrawn.93 
Finally, the SCAF made some efforts to protect religious minorities from 
nonstate acts of violence. For example, the SCAF and the Interior Ministry 
successfully protected celebrations of Coptic Christmas during the 2011–2012 
                                                                                                                 
REPORT FOR 2012, at 51 [hereinafter 2012 REPORT], available at http://www.uscirf.gov/sites
/default/files/resources/Annual%20Report%20of%20USCIRF%202012%282%29.pdf. 
 87. Id. 
 88. See CONSTITUTIONAL DECLARATION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, Mar. 23, 
2011, art. 2 [hereinafter MARCH 2011 CONSTITUTIONAL DECLARATION]. 
 89. Id. art. 6. 
 90. Id. art. 11. 
 91. 2012 REPORT, supra note 86, at 61. 
 92. Id. at 58. 
 93. Id. According to the 2012 report, “some reports have indicated that [an 
unpublicized, subsequent version of the] draft law covers only churches and not other places 
of worship.” Id. 
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holiday season, such that they “passed without incident.”94 Additionally, on 
October 15, 2011, the SCAF gave bite to the new Article 6 by amending the Penal 
Code to ban religious discrimination (among other forms of discrimination), and 
established prison terms and fines for violations of antidiscrimination provisions.95 
3. Limitations of Religious Exercise and Abuses During  
the Revolution’s Immediate Aftermath 
Despite the above steps taken by the SCAF, the revolution and its immediate 
aftermath did not improve the status of minority religious exercise in Egypt. 
Rather, impediments and persecutions both official (by the state) and practical (by 
nonstate actors) continued. 
a. State Actors 
The SCAF continued to allow and even to perpetrate a number of significant 
restrictions on the religious expression of minority religions through both 
obstructive regulations and the facilitation of persecution. 
Regulations impeding minority religious exercise continued as before.96 Despite 
SCAF efforts to amend, the requirement that minority religions have governmental 
approval for building or remodeling their houses of worship remained.97 Though 
reconverts to Christianity were allowed to display their true religious identity 
without indicating their former conversion from Islam on their national ID cards, 
due to a July 3, 2011, court decision, restrictions on Baha’is and other minority 
religious groups regarding their ID cards remained.98 Likewise, the SCAF 
continued the government’s policy of not recognizing certain minority religions, 
and the antiproselytization and apostasy prohibitions remained.99 
SCAF authorities continued to interfere with and persecute religious minorities, 
thereby both directly (through government harassment and attacks) and indirectly 
(through failure to protect religious minorities against sectarian violence) impeding 
their abilities to exercise their respective faiths. For example, on October 9, 2011, 
security forces violently dispersed a group of Copts who were protesting for the 
rebuilding of a church that had been demolished by extremists.100 The security 
forces opened fire on the protestors and killed twelve by running them over with 
military vehicles.101 Likewise, the SCAF continued to allow unrecognized minority 
religions to be arrested and harassed by police forces: “[i]n December 2011, at least 
four Shi’a Muslims reportedly were detained and charged with ‘insulting and 
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denying tenets’ of Islam,” and “[i]n January 2012, Egyptian authorities closed the 
Shi’a Hussein mosque in Cairo to prevent Shi’a Muslims from observing 
Ashura.”102 
SCAF authorities indirectly facilitated the persecution of religious minorities by 
failing to protect religious minorities from acts of violence perpetrated by nonstate 
actors, and by failing to adequately punish perpetrators of such acts, thereby 
passively allowing the destruction of Coptic churches and other acts of sectarian 
violence.103 For example, on May 7–8, 2011, security forces assigned to protect the 
Virgin Mary Church in Imbaba abandoned their post when militants arrived, and 
despite “several indications that groups of Muslims would attempt to attack other 
churches in the area, . . . [security forces did not] deploy[] . . . around other 
churches in the area.”104 The SCAF also continued the use of “reconciliation 
sessions”105 to try to ease sectarian tensions, and did not always seek out and 
punish the perpetrators of such actions.106 
b. Nonstate Actors 
Sectarian violence continued to be the most significant impediment to minority 
religious exercise during this period. According to a report by Voice of America, 
“[i]n 2011, approximately 94 people—mostly Coptic Christians—died as the result 
of sectarian violence in Egypt, 70 [after] the fall of Mubarak.”107 With the upheaval 
of the government and the rise of Islamist groups, nonstate actors had further 
opportunity and greater strength with which to effectively reduce minority 
religions’ exercise abilities to little significance. In 2011, extremists attacked a 
number of historic Sufi mosques in Alexandria,108 set fire to homes of Baha’is in 
the Sohag province,109 demolished the Two Martyrs Church in Cairo and then later 
interfered with its reconstruction,110 and “attempted to storm” (and successfully 
closed) the Mar Mina Church in Imbaba (leaving 15 dead and 242 wounded).111 In 
addition to these acts of violence, “[s]ome Islamist militant groups” took advantage 
of overburdened security forces and began “to impose extra-judicial 
punishments.”112 
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In sum, during the revolution’s immediate aftermath, religious minorities found 
themselves in much the same position as under the Mubarak regime. Though 
efforts were made by the SCAF to reduce restrictions on minority religious 
exercise, many of these efforts proved insufficient. The practical impediments of 
restrictive state regulations, state facilitation of persecution, and nonstate 
persecution and acts of violence all combined to leave the exercise abilities of 
religious minorities still far short of those guaranteed by its governing documents. 
C. Under the Morsi Government 
Over a span encompassing November 2011 to June 2012, Egyptians elected a 
new government113 consisting of a new president and a parliament charged with 
commissioning a panel to design Egypt’s next constitution. The Islamist-dominated 
government, the provisions regarding religion and religious exercise in the new 
Constitution, and the further oppression of and tension with minority religious 
groups by state and nonstate actors yet again prevented many positive 
developments in terms of religious exercise. Instead, the status quo—regulations 
and sectarian violence—remained, and the ratification of a new Constitution laid 
the foundation for greater restrictions on minority religious exercise. 
1. The Morsi Government 
The new Egyptian government was elected under the oversight of the SCAF 
during the beginning months of 2012 and brought with it a wave of new, largely 
Islamist, leaders.114 The 498-seat People’s Assembly (the lower house of 
parliament) was elected between November 2011 and January 2012, with the 
Freedom and Justice Party (affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood) winning 47% 
of the seats, and the Al-Nour Party (affiliated with the Salafis) winning 24% of the 
seats.115 
In March 2012, the newly elected parliament appointed a 100-member 
constitutional design panel—the Constituent Assembly—to draft the nation’s next 
constitution.116 Given the Islamist majority in the lower house of parliament, 
two-thirds of the panel’s members were Islamists, while only 6% of the panel’s 
seats were held by members of a minority religious group (the Copts).117 The small 
                                                                                                                 
 
 113. Though President Mohamed Morsi was not elected until June 2012, long after the 
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number of liberals and minority members on the panel walked out of an early panel 
meeting in protest, and on April 10, 2012, the Supreme Administrative Court 
suspended the panel because it was unrepresentative of the population.118 In early 
June 2012, parliament appointed a new Constituent Assembly that consisted of 
fewer members of parliament—meaning fewer guaranteed seats to Islamists—and 
guaranteed a few seats for appointment by the Coptic Church.119 
In the months after the appointment of the new panel, however, four significant 
developments took place regarding the fate of religious minorities. First, the 
Islamists won the presidency—the Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice 
Party’s Mohamed Morsi was narrowly elected in June 2012—but lost the lower 
house of parliament, which the Egyptian Supreme Constitutional Court dissolved, 
citing concerns over the method of election for seats that constitutionally should 
have been reserved for independent candidates.120 To date, Egypt continues to 
function without a lower house of parliament.121 Second, the judicial branch was 
subjected to a number of challenges both from President Morsi and from the people 
of Egypt: in July 2012, Morsi called the parliament back into session in defiance of 
the SCC (the SCAF and courts prevented enforcement of this decree);122 in 
November 2012, Morsi excluded himself from judicial review (large protests and 
the passage of the constitutional draft ultimately caused Morsi to rescind this 
decree);123 and on December 2, 2012, Islamist protestors at the SCC led the court to 
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suspend operations until the end of the month.124 Third, the Constituent Assembly 
approved the new Constitution on November 29, 2012, over the objections of 
human rights groups and minority members of the Constituent Assembly (for 
reasons discussed below),125 and the people of Egypt ratified the document on 
December 25, 2012.126 Fourth, the populace grew even angrier: protests against 
decisions of the government continued regularly, with the heightened violence 
leading Morsi in one instance to declare a state of emergency in three major 
cities.127 
2. Developments Concerning Religious Exercise Under the Morsi Government 
During the Morsi regime, a number of significant changes occurred. As the 2013 
USCIRF Report discusses, “several positive societal developments 
[occurred] . . . .”128 Among these, the report notes, were the following: 
• “Christian communities . . . [began] to organize with both opposition 
groups and representatives from Al-Azhar to counter religious 
extremism.”129 
• “[M]any Christian churches [began urging] community members to be 
active in the democratic transition of a new Egypt.”130 
• “In February 2013, Christian groups came together to form for the first 
time ever an Egyptian Council of Churches.”131 
• “[M]any diverse interlocutors expressed positive views of the moderating 
role Al-Azhar has played since the January 2011 revolution”—a role that 
has included “spearhead[ing] initiatives[,] . . . publish[ing] statements 
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expressing support for freedom of religion or belief in Egypt,” and 
engaging in “interfaith dialogue initiatives[] aimed at unifying the various 
religious communities and countering extreme Islamist views.”132 
• “[T]he government began to re-open more than 50 existing churches that 
had been closed, in some cases for years.”133 
Perhaps the most significant development, however, was the adoption of a new 
Constitution.134 A number of that document’s clauses had implications for minority 
religious exercise, and some of them—if given force and applied even-handedly to 
all religions in Egypt—could have provided great protections for minority religious 
exercise. However, such clauses (1) included language that either (a) has existed in 
Egypt’s previous constitutions yet proven ineffective, or (b) was limited to only 
recognized religions, and (2) were surrounded by other articles that threatened to 
create a more hardline, Islamist regime. 
The following provisions in the new Constitution constructed a framework 
allowing for minority religions to exercise their faith: 
• Article 31 provided that “[d]ignity is the right of every human being, 
safeguarded by the State” and that “[i]nsulting or showing contempt 
toward any human being shall be prohibited.”135 
• Article 43 provided that “[f]reedom of belief is an inviolable right” and 
further clarified this provision by stating that “[t]he State shall guarantee 
the freedom to practice religious rites and to establish places of worship 
for the divine religions, as regulated by law.”136 
• Article 3 provided that “[t]he canon principles of Egyptian Christians and 
Jews are the main source of legislation for their personal status laws, 
religious affairs, and the selection of their spiritual leaders.”137 
• Article 8 provided that “[t]he State guarantees the means to achieve 
justice, equality and freedom, and is committed . . . to ensur[ing] the 
protection of persons and property . . . within the context of the law.” 138 
• Article 9 provided that “[t]he State shall ensure safety, security and equal 
opportunities for all citizens without discrimination.”139 
However, two factors colored the implementation of the above provisions: 
first, the language of the Articles; and second, the fact that the Constitution 
expanded Islam’s role as the state’s official religion and the foundation of its legal 
culture. 
Regarding the first, the text of several articles raised the following concerns: 
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• Article 43’s guarantee of public religious exercise (through the 
establishment of houses of worship) was limited in application to the 
heavenly religions (accepted branches of Islam, Christianity, and 
Judaism), thereby excluding followers of other religions from its 
protections.140 Furthermore, the Article’s protections of religious exercise 
“[were] limited to ‘rites’ and places of worship,” to the exclusion of other 
forms of religious expression.141 
• “[Article 31] [was] a double-edged sword,” Ahmed Aboul Enein stated. 
“Although it state[d] [that] human dignity is a right and that the state and 
society have to respect it, it also stipulate[d] [that], ‘under no circumstance 
may a citizen be insulted or disrespected.’”142 This, he continued, “[could 
have been] interpreted to . . . limit[] freedom of speech or even [have] lead 
to imprisonment, in the ilk of contempt of religion laws.”143 
• Article 3’s grant that adherents of the heavenly religions may be subject to 
the principles of their own laws was limited to certain areas of the law; 
further, the Article’s grant was only for those few, specific religions.144 As 
such, it legally segregated society into religious factions, officially 
dividing society into religious groups rather than creating one legal code 
acceptable and applicable to all, thus opening the door for sectarian strife. 
Regarding the second, the new Constitution further solidified both Islam’s status 
in the government145 and the state’s role in protecting the morals and values of 
Egyptians. 
• Article 4 endowed the state-supported university in Cairo—Al-Azhar—
with authority over matters of Shari’a law, to be consulted by the 
government in matters of Shari’a interpretation.146 
• Article 44 prohibited the “insult or abuse of all religious messengers and 
prophets”147—a prohibition for which Egyptian officials interviewed for 
the 2013 report “were unequivocal in their support . . . stating that there 
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 145. See id. art. 2. 
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are consequences for insulting or injuring the religious feelings of 
others.”148 
• Article 2’s language remained the same as in previous constitutions,149 but 
Article 219 explained what the “principles of Islamic Sharia” referenced in 
Article 2 were to include: “general evidence, foundational rules, rules of 
jurisprudence, and credible sources accepted in Sunni doctrines and by the 
larger community.”150 
• Article 10 stated that the “family is the basis of the society and is founded 
on religion, morality and patriotism”; accordingly, the Article gave the 
state and society the duty of preserving the “genuine character of the 
Egyptian family . . . and [] protect[ing] its moral values.”151 
• Article 11 gave the state the role of “safeguard[ing] ethics, public morality 
and public order, and foster[ing] a high level of . . . religious . . . 
values.”152 
In sum, while a number of positive societal developments regarding religious 
freedom took place under the Morsi regime, the new Constitution—while 
recognizing and protecting minority religions—formally expanded the role of Islam 
in the state and, in turn, the role of the state in society, thus raising many 
concerns.153 
3. Limitations of Religious Exercise and Abuses Under the Morsi Government 
As discussed above, there were several positive developments under the Morsi 
government. As the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom’s Annual 
Report for 2013 details, the “newly elected government[] . . . made some 
improvements related to freedom of religion or belief[,] . . . there was positive 
social progress between religious communities[,]” and there was “a significant 
decrease in the number of fatalities and injuries from sectarian violence.”154 
However, state and nonstate restrictions, persecutions, and impediments to 
religious exercise persisted. 
a. State Actors 
The Morsi government continued to allow and to perpetrate many of the same 
failures as did the Mubarak regime and the transitional government. The regime 
actively restricted minority religious exercise by continuing to delay compliance 
with the SCC’s ruling that granted identity cards to Baha’is155 and continuing to 
                                                                                                                 
 
 148. 2013 REPORT, supra note 63, at 50. 
 149. See CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 29 Nov. 2012, art. 2.  
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 154. See 2013 REPORT, supra note 63, at 47. 
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2014] FREE EXERCISE AFTER THE ARAB SPRING 1673 
 
make difficult the process of reflecting one’s religious conversion on identity 
documents.156 The requirement of government approval for construction or repair 
of religious facilities remained, and significantly, “[n]o churches were approved for 
new construction or repair in 2012, despite applications being submitted to 
governors.”157 The regime continued to restrict unrecognized religions—for 
example, the regime restricted meetings of Jehovah’s Witnesses to groups of thirty 
and in private homes,158 and publicly declared that Baha’i children “do not have the 
right to register in government schools . . . [because] [t]he state only recognizes 
three religions.”159 Further, state “courts continued to prosecute, convict, and 
imprison Egyptian citizens charged with ‘contempt’ or ‘defamation’ of religion.”160 
The following prosecutions are exemplary: 
• July 2012: A Shi’i teacher “was sentenced to one year in prison . . . for 
contempt of religion and ‘desecration of a place of worship,’ although 
[his] lawyer says he was found guilty solely for praying in a mosque 
according to Shi’i rituals.”161 
• September 2012: A court affirmed a three-year prison sentence for a 
Coptic teacher for a Facebook post of “cartoons defaming the Prophet 
Muhammad.”162 
• November 2012: A court sentenced seven expatriate Copts to death for 
“harming national unity, insulting and publicly attacking Islam, and 
spreading false information,” allegedly for being “associated with the 
‘Innocence of Muslims’ online film.”163 
• December 2012: A court sentenced atheist Alber Saber to three years in 
prison for “posting . . . online content that allegedly ‘insulted God and cast 
doubt on the books of the Abrahamic religions’ and ‘denied the existence 
of God and his creation of mankind.”164 
The Morsi government also maintained the passive posture of former regimes in 
its response to sectarian violence. Specifically, the government often “failed or was 
slow to protect religious minorities from violence,”165 and often “fail[ed] to convict 
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 163. Id. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. at 47. See also Egypt: Address Recurring Sectarian Violence, HUM. RTS. WATCH 
(Apr. 10, 2013), http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/04/10/egypt-address-recurring-sectarian
1674 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 89:1653 
 
those responsible for the violence”166 or convicted instead only adherents of one 
religion but not another,167 thereby “continu[ing] to foster a climate of impunity.”168 
Some Egyptian officials even denied that the violence had anything to do with 
sectarian divides, claiming that “violence experienced by Copts was not a sectarian 
problem . . . but one that affects all Egyptians”—a fact that “Egyptian human rights 
groups and Christian activists refute.”169 
Most concerning, however, is where the Morsi government exceeded its 
forbearers: by providing a bolstered constitutional framework for further restricting 
minority religious exercise. The Articles of the new Constitution170 “affirm[ed] the 
[continued] criminalization of ‘defamation of religion.’”171 They legally divided 
society along religious lines. They placed “Al-Azhar scholars [in] a consultative 
role in reviewing religiously-significant legislation.”172 And, most significantly for 
religious exercise purposes, the Articles protected only limited forms of religious 
expression—“rites” and “places of worship”—and this only for recognized 
religions.173 Thus, the new Constitution made many of the aforementioned 
restrictions on religious exercise constitutional matters, rather than merely statutory 
or social ones as they had been previously, thereby adding further challenges for 
minority religions to overcome. 
b. Nonstate Actors 
Though the body count dropped “significantly” under the Morsi regime,174 
practical restrictions on minority religious exercise by nonstate actors persisted. 
Incitements to violence against religious minorities continued, of which the 
following are illustrative: 
• February 2012: An Alexandrian Salafi leader announced on a television 
program that “Baha’is should be prosecuted for treason because they are 
apostates and are not entitled to any rights in Egypt.”175 
• September 2012: After publication of the Innocence of Muslims film on 
the Internet, “Islamist clerics and some Gulf-funded satellite television 
stations used the film as an opportunity to denounce and demonize Coptic 
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Christians, including a prominent Salafi cleric who publicly defiled and 
ripped a Bible.”176 
Acts of sectarian violence also continued, of which the following three attacks 
are most noteworthy: 
• August 2012: An incident that began as “a dispute between a Christian and 
Muslim at a dry-cleaning business after the Muslim man’s shirt was 
accidentally burned,” ended in one death, several injuries, the destruction 
of several Coptic homes and businesses, and the flight of “nearly all of the 
Christian families” in the area for fear of reprisals.177 
• April 2013: One Muslim and five Christians were killed, and buildings 
and shops were set on fire, in violence in the town of Khosus.178 Though 
the cause of that incident is disputed,179 witnesses reported that, during the 
violence, the cleric of the local mosque “call[ed] out from the 
loudspeaker[,] ‘Kill all the infidels,’” and “ask[ed] everyone to take their 
weapons and attack the church.”180 
• June 2013: What began as a gathering of twenty-four Shia residents of the 
town of Abu Musallim in a private home turned into a riotous conflict, 
with “a crowd of over 1,000 people gather[ing]” outside the house, 
“hurling stones and Molotov cocktails into the house.”181 When four of the 
Shia residents exited the house, “[t]he crowd attacked, beat, stabbed and 
lynched the four men,” and “[v]ideo footage show[ed] their bloodied 
lifeless bodies being kicked on the ground and then dragged through the 
streets.”182 
In sum, under the Morsi regime, religious minorities found themselves in much 
the same position as before. Though positive developments occurred and the death 
toll of sectarian violence dropped, many acts of sectarian violence still occurred. 
Many of the same restrictions on minority religious exercise, both official and 
practical, remained. And the enactment of the new Constitution not only threatened 
to make former restrictions matters of constitutional concern, but also created new 
impediments to minority religious exercise. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 176. Id. at 52. 
 177. Id. at 53. 
 178. Egypt: Address Recurring Sectarian Violence, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Apr. 10, 2013), 
http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/04/10/egypt-address-recurring-sectarian-violence. 
 179. See id. (One news agency stated that “Muslim residents became outraged after 
people they believed to be Christian children sprayed a swastika onto the wall of a religious 
institute affiliated to Al Azhar,” while “[s]ome local residents claim that a fight between 
Christian children playing soccer and a Muslim man and his sister escalated after their 
families became involved.”). 
 180. Id. 
 181. Egypt: Lynching of Shia Follows Months of Hate Speech, HUM. RTS. WATCH (June 
27, 2013), http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/06/27/egypt-lynching-shia-follows-months-hate
-speech. 
 182. Id. 
1676 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 89:1653 
 
D. The June 30 Revolution and Its Immediate Aftermath 
As it would turn out, the Morsi regime proved to be short lived. Over the second 
half of 2013, the government fell, the military installed a transitional government, 
and constitutional amendments were proposed. Yet, while the constitutional 
developments would allay some fears stemming from the 2012 Constitution’s 
original language, many of the same restrictions, persecutions, and acts of sectarian 
violence would continue. 
1. The Return to Tahrir 
After repeated allegations of ineptitude, as well as opposition concerns over the 
regime’s policies and its creation of an increasingly Islamist government,183 
Egyptians throughout the country rose up in protest on June 30, 2013, to demand 
Morsi’s resignation.184 Large, pro-Morsi counterprotests ensued,185 and on that 
same day, the Egyptian military gave Morsi a forty-eight-hour deadline to “meet 
the demands of the people”186 before it would intervene to restore order187 and 
impose its own “road map” out of the crisis.188 Morsi openly defied the military’s 
ultimatum and, with gun battles across the country between pro- and anti-
government factions ensuing, set the stage for a dramatic confrontation with the 
military.189 On July 3, the military made good on its ultimatum by removing Morsi 
from power and suspending the Constitution.190 
The military did much to reshape the political landscape in Egypt, but not 
without great cost. After removing Morsi, the military installed a senior judge of 
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the SCC as interim president and declared that while “‘peaceful protests’ could 
continue, . . . [it] would respond with ‘strength and determination’ to any outbreaks 
of violence.”191 Over the following weeks and months the military systematically 
disbanded,192 and the transitional government banned outright,193 the Muslim 
Brotherhood; violently dispersed pro-Morsi demonstrations;194 and arrested 
former-President Morsi195 and placed him on trial for “inciting the murder of 
protestors demonstrating outside Cairo’s presidential palace [in] December 
[2012].”196 
Despite its bloody crackdown on Islamists and supporters of the former regime, 
the military once again set Egypt on a path to democracy—albeit a version of 
democracy in which the military would play a significant role. On July 6, 2013, the 
military issued a constitutional declaration, which established a process for 
amending the suspended 2012 Constitution.197 On January 14 and 15, 2014, 
Egyptians approved yet another Constitution by an overwhelming margin (98.1% 
of voters), but turnout was only 38.6% of the electorate as supporters of the Morsi 
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government and Islamist groups boycotted the election.198 In March 2014, 
Egyptian’s Interim President, Aldy Mansour, announced that presidential elections 
would be held by mid-summer 2014,199 with parliamentary elections to follow 
thereafter.200 Thus, Egypt entered yet another transitional phase—another chance to 
lay a foundation for social justice and increased freedoms. 
2. Developments Concerning Religious Exercise  
Under the Transitional Government 
Under the transitional government, “freedom of belief and the freedom to 
practice religious rites” were guaranteed in the interim by the July 2013 
constitutional declaration.201 But the most significant, long-lasting, and potentially 
positive development for religious minorities was the passage of an amended 
Constitution that rolled back much of the religious language of the document it 
replaced and, as of this writing, appears to establish a foundation for greater 
religious exercise. 
Though retaining Article 2 and repeating that the “principles of Islamic Sharia 
are the principal source of legislation,” 202 the amended Constitution removed much 
of the religious language present in the 2012 Constitution. Specifically, the 
amended Constitution did the following: 
• Removed language in what formerly was Article 4 (and renumbered the 
amended language as Article 7), which required the government to consult 
with Al-Azhar on matters of Shari’a interpretation.203 
• Amended the language of Article 10 to say that “[t]he state protects [the 
family’s] cohesion and stability, and the consolidation of its values.”204 
• Deleted Article 11, which gave the state the role of “safeguard[ing] ethics, 
public morality and public order, and foster[ing] a high level of . . . 
religious . . . values.”205 
                                                                                                                 
 
 198. See Egypt Referendum: ‘98% Back New Constitution,’ supra note 13. 
 199. See Egypt’s Presidential Elections Commission Issues Regulations for Upcoming 
Polls, AHRAM ONLINE (Mar. 17, 2014), http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/96923
/Egypt/Politics-/Egypts-Presidential-Elections-Commission-issues-re.aspx. 
 200. See Marie-Louise Gumuchian & Yousuf Basil, Egypt to Have Presidential Elections 
First, CNN (Jan. 26, 2014, 2:34 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/01/26/world/africa/egypt
-violence/. 
 201. JULY 2013 CONSTITUTIONAL DECLARATION, art. 7, supra note 197. 
 202. CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 18 Jan. 2014, pmbl. 
 203. Compare CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 18 Jan. 2014, art. 7, with 
CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 30 Nov. 2012, art. 4. 
 204. CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 18 Jan. 2014, art. 10. Compare id., 
with CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 30 Nov. 2012, art. 10 (giving the state 
and society the duty to preserve the character of the family and protect moral values). 
 205. CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 30 Nov. 2012, art. 11. Compare 
id., with CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 18 Jan. 2014 (containing no such 
provision). 
2014] FREE EXERCISE AFTER THE ARAB SPRING 1679 
 
• Amended the language of Article 43 (and renumbered it as Article 64) to 
say that freedom of belief is “absolute.”206 
• Deleted Article 44, which prohibited the “[i]nsult or abuse of all religious 
messengers and prophets.”207 
• Replaced Article 219, which explained what the “principles of Islamic 
Sharia” were to include, with a sentence in the preamble stating that the 
rulings of the Supreme Constitutional Court were instead to be the 
“reference for the interpretation of such principles.” 208 
Additionally, the amended Constitution included a number of new provisions 
recognizing and seeking to protect minority religious groups. The following 
provisions are most noteworthy: 
• The Preamble notes that the “Constitution . . . holds all of us equal in 
rights and duties without discrimination of any kind,”209 and Article 53 
states that “[a]ll citizens are equal before the Law . . . in rights, freedoms 
and general duties, without discrimination based on religion [or] belief,” 
and that “[d]iscrimination and incitement of hatred is a crime punishable 
by Law,” and charges the state to “take all necessary measures for 
eliminating all forms of discrimination” and to create “an independent 
commission for this purpose.”210 
• Articles 47 and 50 charge the state to “maintain the Egyptian cultural 
identity with its diversified branches of civilization,”211 noting that 
“Egypt’s civilization and cultural heritage, whether physical or moral, 
including all diversities and principal milestones—namely Ancient 
Egyptian, Coptic, and Islamic—is a national and human wealth,” and that 
“[t]he State shall pay special attention to protecting components of cultural 
pluralism in Egypt.”212 
• Article 93 states that “[t]he State shall be bound by the international 
human rights agreements, covenants and conventions ratified by Egypt, 
and [these] shall have the force of law after publication in accordance with 
the prescribed conditions.”213 
• Article 99 states that “[a]ny violation of personal freedom, or the sanctity 
of the private life of citizens, or any other public rights and freedoms 
which are guaranteed by the Constitution and the Law is a crime,” grants 
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that “[t]he affected party shall have the right to bring a direct criminal 
action,” provides that “[t]he State shall guarantee fair compensation for 
the victims of such violations,” and allows the National Council for 
Human Rights to “file a complaint with the Public Prosecution of any 
violation of these rights” and to “intervene in the civil lawsuit in favor of 
the affected party at its request.”214 
• Article 214 requires that “[t]he law shall specify the independent national 
councils, including the National Council for Human Rights,” and that 
“[t]he law shall state the composition, mandates, and guarantees for the 
independence and neutrality of [its] respective members.” It also grants 
the council “the right to report to the competent authorities any violations 
pertaining to [its] field[] of work” and its own “legal personality,” and 
requires it to be “consulted with respect to the bills and regulations 
pertaining to [its] affairs and field[] of work.”215 
• Articles 235 and 244—specifically addressing Christians—require the 
state in its first legislative term to “issue a law to regulate constructing and 
renovating churches, in a manner that guarantees the freedom to practice 
religious rituals for Christians,”216 and in its first election to “endeavor that 
. . . Christians . . . be appropriately represented in the first House of 
Representatives.”217 
• Article 224 requires that “[t]he state shall be obliged to issue laws 
executing the provisions of this Constitution.”218 
While these amended provisions do a number of things to protect religious 
minorities—ensure equality before the law, make discrimination a crime, create 
commissions to eliminate discrimination, celebrate and protect cultural diversity, 
recognize international human rights agreements, provide a criminal cause of action 
for violation of Constitutional rights, empower a human rights council to intervene 
on behalf of victims of such violations, guarantee compensation to victims of such 
violations, provide for the construction of churches, require Christians to be 
adequately represented in the parliament, and require the state to execute provisions 
of the Constitution—many of the same problems that religious minorities face 
remain unaddressed in the Constitution. Religious exercise is limited to the 
practicing of religious rites and to the establishment of places of worship, and these 
liberties are only accorded to followers of the three heavenly religions.219 And the 
provision directing the state to regulate the construction and renovation of houses 
of worship is limited to Christian churches only.220 However, these amended 
provisions do establish a sturdier framework for the exercise of minority religious 
rights than did the 2012 Constitution. 
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3. Limitations of Religious Exercise and Abuses  
Under the Transitional Government 
Despite the constitutional developments discussed above, state and nonstate 
restrictions on minority religious exercise continue as before. 
a. State Actors 
Former state restrictions on minority religious exercise—identity card issues, 
recognition only of certain religions, requirements for permission for the building 
or repair of houses of worship, etc.221—persist. Additionally, and most egregiously, 
the state has continued its failure to adequately protect against or to effectively 
address acts of sectarian violence. According to Human Rights Watch, “[i]n the 
vast majority of the 42 cases” of sectarian violence that they documented 
throughout July and August 2013, “neither the police nor the military were present 
at the start or during the attack[s],”222 despite the fact that, “‘[f]or weeks, everyone 
could see these attacks coming.’”223 “Church clergy throughout Upper Egypt,” the 
report continued, “expressed frustration and desperation that security services did 
not quickly intervene to stop the widespread attacks.”224 As one Coptic bishop 
stated, “‘[Church officials] spoke to the prime minister, minister of interior, and a 
military official asking them to intervene,’ . . . [and they] promised to send 
protection, but it never arrived.”225 As a Coptic priest surmised, “The government 
let us burn, so they could show the world the Brotherhood burning us.”226 
Yet, the situation remains unchanged. As a police officer in Luxor told Human 
Rights Watch, security forces have failed to act because they simply do not know 
what to do: “Put yourself in my position, and ask yourself two questions. First, do 
you fire live fire[, and on whom]? Who will be killed . . . ? Second, . . . [w]hat do 
you do if you don’t get an order that will allow you to take more action?”227 
Luxor’s security director, Major Khalid Mamdouh, went so far as to tell Human 
Rights Watch that “it’s not [the police’s] job to stop killings, we just investigate 
afterward.”228 Therefore, despite the crackdown by security forces on political 
                                                                                                                 
 
 221. See supra Part II.C.3.a. Note that even though Article 235 directs the new 
government to pass a law regulating the building and renovation of churches—an act which 
the transitional government could not accomplish to the satisfaction of all parties in 2011, 
see supra notes 91–93 and accompanying text—this provision is limited only to Christian 
churches and still involves the state’s regulatory hand in the practice of a minority religion. 
See CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 18 Jan. 2014, art. 235. 
 222. Egypt: Mass Attacks on Churches, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Aug. 22, 2013), 
http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/08/21/egypt-mass-attacks-churches. 
 223. Id. (quoting Joe Stork, the “acting Middle East director at Human Rights Watch”). 
 224. Id. For a detailed account of the failure of security forces to act, see id. 
 225. Id. (quoting Anba Makarios, the Coptic Bishop General of Minya). 
 226. Laura King, Attack on Wedding Is Latest Horror for Egypt’s Coptic Christians, 
L.A. TIMES (Oct. 21, 2013), http://articles.latimes.com/2013/oct/21/world/la-fg-egypt
-church-shooting-20131022 (quoting Father Maximum Nemr). 
 227. Egypt: Sectarian Attacks Amid Political Crisis, HUM. RTS. WATCH (July 23, 2013), 
http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/07/23/egypt-sectarian-attacks-amid-political-crisis. 
 228. Id. 
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violence, security forces either remain unwilling to intervene in acts of sectarian 
violence or, as this officer described, are paralyzed as to how to respond to such 
violence. 
b. Nonstate Actors 
After the June 30 Revolution, sectarian violence escalated dramatically—
particularly violence against Coptic Christians, whom many Islamists blamed for 
the downfall of the Morsi government.229 Human Rights Watch reported that, 
between July 3 and July 23, “at least six attacks on Christians [took] place . . . 
across Egypt.”230 In one such attack, Morsi supporters “looted and burned St. 
George’s Coptic Catholic church and al-Saleh church in the village of Delga,” 
injuring eight.231 In another, Morsi supporters “attacked St. Mary’s church, set fire 
to a security booth outside the church, and attacked a police station there.”232 
The most widespread violence, however, occurred between August 14 and 21, 
when “attackers . . . torched and looted scores of churches and Christian property 
across the country.”233 In one case in the city of Minya, attackers burned the Anba 
Moussa church and a Christian orphanage, and painted red and black Xs on shops 
in the area to distinguish between Muslim- and Christian-owned stores234—stores 
marked as Christian-owned then were attacked.235 Per several accounts, many of 
                                                                                                                 
 
 229. See Jeffrey Fleishman, Christian-Muslim Animosity Becomes Incendiary Subplot in 
Egypt, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 20, 2013), http://articles.latimes.com/2013/aug/20/world/la-fg
-egypt-sectarian-20130820. It is worth mentioning that “the Coptic pope, Tawadros II, 
appeared alongside army chief Abdel Fattah Sisi on nationwide television on July 3 to 
announce that Morsi had been removed from office.” King, supra note 226. 
 230. Egypt: Sectarian Attacks Amid Political Crisis, supra note 227. 
 231. Id. 
 232. Id. 
 233. Egypt: Mass Attacks on Churches, supra note 222. Human Rights Watch compiled 
the following list of burned, damaged, or attacked churches: Abu Sifin Church; Abu Teeg 
Bishopric; Adventist Church; Al-Amir Tadros al-Shatbi Church; Al-Amir Tadros Church, 
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Church; Al-Younaniyya al-Qadeema Church; Baptist Church; Evangelical Church, Asyut; 
Evangelical Church, Fayum; Evangelical Church, Minya; Evangelical Church, Minya – Bani 
Mazar; Franciscan Catholic Church and School; Franciscan Church and School, Asyut; 
Franciscan Church and School, Suez; Good Shepherd Catholic Church and School, Minya; 
Good Shepherd Catholic Church and School, Suez; Karmet al-Rosul Church; Mar Gergas 
Coptic Church; Mar Gerges Church; Mar Gerges Church Services Building; Mar Meena 
Church; Mar Meena Coptic Church; Mar Yohanna Church; Nahdet al-Qadasa Church; Saints 
Mary and Ibram Coptic Church; Saviour’s Anglican Church; St. George Coptic Church and 
Diocesan Office; St. George Hadayeq Church; St. Mary Church, Fayum – al-Manala; St. 
Mary Church, Fayum; St. Mary Church, Giza – Deir Hakim; St. Mary Church, Giza – 
al-Mansouriya; St. Therese Church. Id. 
 234. Alexander Dziadosz, Egypt’s Political Strife Puts Christians in Peril, ASWAT 
MASRIYA (Aug. 21, 2013, 10:25 AM), http://en.aswatmasriya.com/analysis/view.aspx?id
=91bed416-cdef-4d77-a570-fb250f992685. 
 235. See Egypt: Mass Attacks on Churches, supra note 222. 
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these attacks were by Islamists directly in response to the June 30 Revolution: for 
instance, those who burnt down the St. George Coptic Church in Sohag and the 
Saints Mary and Ibram Church in Delga chanted “Islamic, Islamic” while storming 
the churches—a chant that, according to Human Rights Watch, is common to 
“proponents of an Islamic state.”236 As one man standing guard outside the St. 
George’s Church in Helwan stated, “The Muslim Brotherhood wants to burn down 
the country.”237 He noted, however, the very different posture of his non-Islamist 
Muslim neighbors: “[t]he Muslims in this neighborhood brought [cookies]” to the 
guards and “came to protect the church.”238 
Attacks continued throughout the remainder of 2013, with one notable instance 
occurring in Cairo in mid-October. At the Church of the Virgin Mary, churchgoers 
were attending a series of weddings in the church when gunmen opened fire, killing 
four—one of whom was the eight-year-old niece of one of the brides that 
evening—and wounding nineteen.239 
E. Summing up the Situation: The Problems that Remain 
In sum, the situation for religious minorities in Egypt has improved little over 
the course of the January 25 and June 30 Revolutions. The main restrictions on 
religious exercise, both official and practical, remain: Baha’is and other 
non-heavenly religions are still not recognized by the state;240 proselytization is still 
forbidden;241 apostasy (leaving Islam) is still prohibited;242 religious identity is still 
required on national ID forms;243 and minorities still require government 
permission for building or modifying their houses of worship.244 The state 
continues to limit minority religious exercise through the above methods and to 
facilitate the persecution of minorities through its persistent failure to adequately 
deal with and prevent antiminority violence,245 and nonstate actors continue their 
attacks on minority religious groups.246 
Adherents of minority religions in Egypt face two challenges in the aftermath of 
the Arab Spring: first, their government has repeatedly demonstrated a lack of 
accountability in protecting their property, religious exercise, and lives;247 and 
second, they are surrounded by an armed and angry populace that, already prone to 
deadly acts of sectarian violence,248 is now more religiously charged than in the 
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past, given the prominent role that Islamists have played in the recent political 
instability. 
Therefore, restrictions on minority religious exercise in Egypt could very well 
increase in the aftermath of the revolution—at the very least, from a practical 
standpoint in terms of sectarian violence—making the situation of Egypt’s religious 
minorities worse under the new democracy than they were under the regimes prior 
to the Arab Spring. 
III. PROTECTING MINORITY RELIGIOUS EXERCISE 
In light of this potential, Egypt must act to reverse the tide of restrictions and 
abuses of religious exercise for its minorities. And the best way it can do so is this: 
to enshrine religious liberty and free exercise in the nation’s foundational 
document—its new, amended Constitution—through guaranteed rights and 
effective enforcement mechanisms that implement such rights against both state 
and nonstate actors.249 Many of the new Constitution’s provisions create a 
foundation upon which Egypt’s new leaders can build structural mechanisms to 
protect minority religious exercise, and many provisions explicitly protect such 
minority religions.250 However, if not acted upon, these provisions will be only 
aspirational sentiments—mere text, not protections. Accordingly, Egypt should 
engage in the following steps: 
A. Adopt the SCC’s interpretation of Article 46 of the 1971 Constitution as 
governing the application of Article 64 of the new Constitution;251 
B. Ensure the creation and continuance of institutional structures to 
incentivize accountability and enforcement of religious freedom 
guarantees; 
C. Ensure that the Constitution’s horizontal rights provisions protecting 
freedom of belief and religious practice are enforced; 
D. Ensure the enforcement in domestic courts of international human rights 
conventions to which it has agreed; and  
E. Remove the restrictive language from constitutional provisions that 
guarantee religious freedom. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 249. Constitutional provisions that include minority religions in the structure of 
government could certainly help the situation, but given the overwhelming dominance of 
Muslims in Egypt (90% of the population), such provisions are not likely to bring about 
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 250. See supra Part II.D.2. 
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A. Adopt the SCC’s Expansive Interpretation of Freedom of Religious Practice 
Egypt should explicitly adopt the SCC’s 1996 interpretation of Article 46 of the 
1971 Constitution as the governing interpretation of the similar provision in the 
new constitution—Article 64.252 In Case No. 8 of Judicial Year 17, the Court 
determined that the guarantee of “freedom of belief and . . . of practice of religious 
rights” in then-Article 46 prevented compulsion to “believe in,” to “declare,” to 
“withdraw from,” or to “favor . . . by way of contempt, defamation or renunciation” 
any religion.253 The language of the new Article 64 similarly guarantees freedom of 
belief and “freedom to practice religious rites”; therefore, it should be interpreted in 
the same manner.254 As the preamble of the new Constitution states that the SCC’s 
decisions on matters of Sharia are to be considered the official interpretations of 
such issues, the SCC’s 1996 interpretation should thus be enshrined as the official 
interpretation of this specific provision. 
Such an action should provide a constitutional basis (pending effective 
enforcement) for solving a number of problems for minority religious groups. For 
one, it would prevent the forced declaration of one’s religious affiliation on the 
national ID card and, thus, the discrimination associated with the government’s 
failure to recognize certain religions, such as the Baha’i faith.255 For another, it 
would prevent believers of one religion from being compelled to adhere to another 
religion in which they do not believe, and it could also be used to protect minorities 
against anti-apostasy laws.256 
B. Ensure that Institutional Structures Are Created and Continue to Enable 
Effective Enforcement of Rights and to Hold State Actors Accountable 
Egypt must ensure that institutional structures exist to effectuate the religious 
exercise rights contained in the Constitution, lest the state continue its regulation 
of, interference with, and persecution of religious minorities, and further tolerate 
nonstate violence against religious minorities. Specifically, the state must provide 
religious minorities with effective means of preventing rights abuses by the state—
through structural accountability—and with meaningful redress of rights violations 
from the state or nonstate actors. It should do so in two ways: first, by maintaining 
the judiciary as an independent branch and altering it to grant religious minorities a 
presence within it; and second, by creating human rights commissions with duties 
to investigate allegations of religious exercise violations, to make public reports on 
their findings, and to prosecute both state and nonstate violators. 
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The judicial branch can provide an effective venue for enforcing rights of 
religious exercise—indeed, the SCC has done so before257—and, likely recognizing 
this, the new Constitution provides private causes of action for “[a]ny violation of 
personal freedom, or the sanctity of the private life of citizens, or any other public 
rights and freedoms which are guaranteed by the Constitution and the Law” to be 
enforced in the courts.258 However, given the role that the judiciary has played in 
enforcing restrictions of religious liberty,259 the judiciary must have two qualities in 
order to provide an effective forum for the adjudication of such causes of action. 
First, it must truly be an independent branch, free from majoritarian or dictatorial 
influence, and given due respect by the other branches.260 Chapters Three and Four 
of the Constitution establish it as such261—in particular, the SCC remains an 
“independent judicial body”262 that is “solely competent to decide on the 
constitutionality of laws and regulations [and] to interpret legislative 
provisions”263—but these provisions must be adhered to by both the executive and 
legislative branches if the opinions of the court system are to be truly effective. 
The second quality that the judiciary must have is that its members must be 
chosen in such a way as to include religious minorities. Article 186 now states that 
the “conditions and procedures for [judicial] appointment[s] . . . shall be regulated 
by law,”264 and Article 193 seems to indicate that the SCC is composed of 
presidential appointees.265 Further language should be added to these chapters—or, 
at the very least, to the regulations of the judiciary—that would explicitly include 
the governing authorities of each religious minority in the nomination process, and 
would reserve a portion of the SCC’s seats for religious minorities. This would help 
to ensure the inclusion of minority voices in both the composition of the court and 
the selection process. 
Further, the human rights commissions addressed in the new Constitution—a 
commission for the elimination of discrimination and a national council on human 
                                                                                                                 
 
 257. See supra note 48 and accompanying text; see also Brown, supra note 24, at 1083–
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rights266—must be established and empowered to investigate (on their own or on 
request by aggrieved parties), report, prosecute, and intervene in cases involving 
violations of religious exercise rights committed by state or nonstate actors.267 
These commissions must truly be given the autonomy over their affairs and 
budgets that Article 214 commands,268 and they must be comprised of individuals 
selected with the input of the leadership of the various religious minorities in order 
to ensure that they remain independent from majoritarian forces. These bodies can 
provide a special investigative and prosecutorial force aimed at enforcing the 
country’s religious exercise provisions by policing the affairs of the state—helping 
to ensure effective prevention and redress of impermissible state regulations, 
activities, and failures to protect religious minorities—and the acts of nonstate 
actors.269 
C. Ensure that the Constitution’s Horizontal Rights Provisions Are Enforced 
Egypt must ensure that the horizontal rights created in its new Constitution—
namely, Article 53’s right to be free from discrimination270 and Article 99’s right to 
enjoy the “personal freedom, . . . sanctity of the private life of citizens, [and] any 
other public rights and freedoms which are guaranteed by the Constitution and the 
Law”271—are enforced in order to both prevent acts of violence and provide 
effective penalties for such acts committed by nonstate actors against adherents of 
religious minorities.272 By providing a Constitutional cause of action for aggrieved 
religious minorities, horizontally applicable rights provide greater force for 
religious minorities in demanding justice from the state, and they ought to be used 
to implement heavy punishments against violators. 
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D. Enforce International Human Rights Conventions in Domestic Courts 
 
 Egypt should enforce the international human rights conventions to which it is a 
signatory in its domestic courts. Indeed, Article 93 of the new Constitution provides 
that “[t]he State shall be bound by the international human rights agreements, 
covenants and conventions ratified by Egypt,” and that these “shall have the force of 
law.”273 Egypt is a signatory to a number of international human rights conventions 
guaranteeing rights of religious exercise, including the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (UDHR) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR).274 If these are to have the “force of law,” they must actually be enforced and 
adjudicated by the judiciary. 
 Providing for the enforcement of these provisions in domestic courts would further 
protect religious minorities in the exercise of their religious beliefs by giving them 
additional enforceable rights that carry with them international overtones. These 
conventions would open the door for the entry of international legal doctrines 
regarding religious exercise and represent a way that religious freedom in Egypt could 
expand to protect minority religions not recognized by Islam and to include religious 
conduct not tolerated by Islamic law, such as freedom to proselytize and to convert. 
 
E. Remove Limitations from Current Religious Freedom Provisions 
Egypt should remove the language that restricts the religious exercise rights 
established by Article 64 of the new Constitution, removing reference both to specific 
religions and to further “regulat[ion] by law.”275 Regarding the former, the language 
limiting that article’s guarantee of the “freedom of practicing religious rituals and 
establishing worship places for the followers of Abrahamic religious” (meaning 
Christianity, Islam, and Judaism) should be stricken so that all minority religions in 
Egypt (Baha’is, Shi’a, etc.), not merely those who meet this favored classification, 
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might claim this protection as their own.276 The removal of this phrase would allow 
Article 64 to be applied as broadly as Egyptian courts will be willing to interpret it—
that is, though this language at this time still likely will be viewed through the lens of 
Islamic teachings (i.e., it will be read to apply only to recognized religions), it could 
apply to all religions if and when the state is willing to apply it thus.277 
Regarding the latter, the language at the end of Article 64, subjugating its 
guarantees to further “regulat[ion] by law,” should be removed so that its guarantees 
are not subject to restriction, revision, or reinterpretation by mere statute, but are 
instead elevated to a more truly “absolute” status subject only to the provisions of the 
Constitution itself.278 This should accomplish two protections of minority religions: 
formally, this would elevate from second-tier status the right to freedom of belief, 
practice, and places of worship, placing this right above the reach of Islamist 
majorities in parliament, who otherwise could limit it by a simple majority vote; 
practically, this should solve the problem created by the 1856 requirement that the 
executive branch approve construction or maintenance of houses of worship, by 
granting an explicit right to establish places of worship.279 
CONCLUSION 
As the foregoing attests, the situation for religious minorities in post-Arab Spring 
Egypt is a tenuous one. Though the January 25 Revolution, birthed out of a struggle 
for greater rights and liberties, gave hope for freer religious exercise by minority 
religions, the same struggles and restrictions remain, and, given the increased religious 
tensions in the aftermath of the June 30 Revolution, they unfortunately threaten to 
increase. The oppressors of former days and regimes are gone, but new oppressors 
cyclically arise in their stead, and restrictions of minority religious exercise continue. 
With tensions running high, and with two revolutions in the span of three years, Egypt 
cannot afford to allow these problems to languish. The government must act decisively 
in the present if its religious minorities are to have a future in the country—a future for 
which they have given much in the Arab Spring revolutions. 
This Note argues that the most serious and meaningful step that Egyptians can take 
is to create strong constitutional protections and an effective framework for exercising 
those protections, and it recommends five specific individual rights-based reforms that 
should be undertaken in order to right the wrongs of the current system. Perhaps, if 
these are followed, adherents of Egypt’s religious minorities may finally be able to 
exercise their beliefs more freely, and the revolutions will, for them, have not been in 
vain. 
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